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Turkish Captives in Hungary during Austria’s Last 
Turkish War (1788–91)
During the last Turkish war of  the Habsburg Monarchy (1788–91), several hundred 
Ottoman soldiers were taken prisoner by the Habsburg army and accommodated in 
Hungarian fortresses. Numerous rules and orders were issued by Joseph II regarding 
the treatment of  these prisoners. These rules represent interesting mixes of  the new 
ideas of  the Enlightenment and old habits. According to these regulations, the captured 
Turks were given the status of  prisoner of  war and were provided with regular supplies. 
The study also examines the circumstances of  the capture, the lives, and often the deaths 
of  the Turkish prisoners in Hungary, as well as the exchanges of  prisoners, which began 
only slowly but eventually resulted in their release. The fate of  the Austrian prisoners in 
Turkish captivity is also briefly discussed. The paper was completed exclusively on the 
basis of  primary sources. 
Keywords: Austro–Turkish War (1788–91), prisoners of  war, treatment of  captives, 
exchanges of  prisoners, Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor, King of  Hungary
Introduction
Until recently, the fate of  captives and prisoners of  war was one of  the most 
neglected chapters of  the military history.1 Interest in this topic, however, has 
grown considerably, parallel with the evolution of  new approaches, e. g. “the 
new military history” or John Keegan’s novel perspective of  the common 
soldier. These current trends in military history also have evinced significantly 
more interest in the fate of  noncombatants and other “minor characters” of  the 
conflicts than previous histories of  “the warlords.” Inspired by a vague notion, 
this study examines the question of  Turkish prisoners held captive in Hungary 
during the Turkish War of  Joseph II, a topic that in the end proved more 
interesting than one might first have assumed, and also by and large has been 
1  I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ferenc Lenkefi (War Archive in Budapest) and to Dr. 
György Domokos (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, Vienna) for their indispensable help during 
my researches. 
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ignored in the secondary literature.2 In the historiography, prisoners are usually 
presented only as a data, in spite of  the fact that there is a wealth of  sources on 
which scholars could draw. I found valuable and essentially untouched archival 
materials on the Turkish prisoners of  war in the Military Archive in Budapest, 
where the documents of  the Hungarian General Commando (the territorial 
organization of  the Habsburg military administration, the “outstretched arm” 
of  the Aulic War Council) is preserved. Not surprisingly, the other rich source, 
one is tempted to use the word “goldmine,” is the archival material of  the Aulic 
War Council in the Kriegsarchiv Vienna. The so-called Lacy-reforms from 1766 
established an unparalleled bureaucracy, and the records that were kept provide 
researchers with a vast array of  sources. This raw material of  the Habsburg 
military administration is especially useful if  one is interested in going beyond the 
traditional themes of  military history, as in this particular case, which concerns 
the treatment with prisoners. For example, the thorough Habsburg bureaucracy 
recorded the names, the ranks, the ages and the origins of  thousands of  Turkish 
prisoners in muster rolls, so we have a precise overview of  the contemporary 
Ottoman army in the Balkans. 
In addition, one can glean significant data concerning the army and the 
state of  the enlightened absolutisms at work. The fates of  the Turkish prisoners 
suggest a rigid, slow system that was, however, not without humanity. This state 
was headed by a restless but also very demanding ruler, Joseph II. His short 
but usually comprehensive and sometimes sarcastic notes on the files may well 
reveal more about his personality than the hundreds of  studies that have been 
written on him, whether apologetic or condemning. His decisions in concrete 
cases show the limits of  his “enlightened” thinking.
2  The standard literature on the Turkish war: Oskar Criste, Kriege unter Kaiser Josef  II (Vienna: Seidel, 1904). 
This book, however, was interrupted by the death of  Joseph II on February 20, 1790, despite the fact that 
the operations lasted for almost another half  year. During the nineteenth century, in the Austrian military 
journal (Streffleurs Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift) the history of  the operations by theatres and corps 
were worked out in detail in several studies, but the authors, being soldiers, focused mainly on the strategic 
and tactical consequences of  the events. The American historian Matthew Z. Mayer, in his two unpublished 
works Joseph II and the campaign of  the 1788 against the Ottoman Turks (Master’s Thesis McGill University, 
1997) and Joseph II and the Austro-Ottoman War 1788–1791 (PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2002) covered 
the whole war based on the documents of  the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna, but he concentrated mainly on the 
performance of  Joseph II as a military leader. For a short summary, see Michael Hochedlinger, Austria’s 
War of  Emergence, 1683–1797 (London: Pearson Education, 2003), 376–98, and for a more recent account, 
Derek Beales, Joseph II. Against the World 1780–1790, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
555–86. With regards to the Ottomans, see Virgina H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700–1870. An Empire Besieged 
(London: Pearson Education, 2007), 160–79. 
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This study is concerned first and foremost with the Ottoman prisoners in 
Austrian captivity and in the area of  Hungary.3 Did they enjoy the same treatment 
as their Western counterparts? Was their status as prisoners of  war acknowledged 
at all? What sort of  rules applied to them? How could the Austrian military 
bureaucracy solve the potential problems of  supplying hundreds of  people from 
another religion and culture with shelter and sustenance, however minimal? How 
did their captivity come to an end?  
First, I am going to summarize the contemporary norms and practices 
regarding prisoners of  war in Europe. Then, I will describe the rules issued 
by Joseph II in the course of  this war. I also discuss the circumstances under 
which the masses of  prisoners were taken, the details of  their transportation, 
accommodation and supply in Hungary, and the problems that arose concerning 
the maintenance of  watch over them and numerous events, such as outbreaks of  
unrest and escapes. I also touch briefly on the conditions under which the Austrian 
soldiers in Ottoman captivity lived, since their fates were intertwined with those 
of  the captured Turks during the exchange processes. The development of  these 
processes proved to be rather interesting, and many useful sources are available, 
so the question of  prisoner exchange is one of  the focal points of  my study. 
Captivity in the Eighteenth Century
It is difficult to find a comprehensive work regarding the unwritten law of  captivity 
before the age of  formal international conventions and the Great War. Although 
the “ransom-culture” of  the Middle Ages4 and the Early Modern Period5 have 
met with some interest among historians, the Age of  Enlightenment (what one 
might also refer to as the Napoleonic period) was rather neglected from this 
point of  view, apart from some cursory comments in standard works and some 
3 During the war, captured Ottoman soldiers and other subjects of  the Sultan (e. g. Ypsilanti, the Prince 
of  the Ottoman vassal state, Moldau, was interned in Brünn) were also accommodated for a shorter or 
longer period of  time in the other provinces of  the Kingdom of  Hungary: Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, 
and in other parts of  the empire, Galicia and occupied Wallachia. They were present in these places in small 
numbers, so I make only infrequent mention of  them. 
4  E. g. Rémy Ambühl, Prisoners of  War in the Hundred Years War. Ransom Culture in the Late Middle Ages 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
5  On the practices of  the “classic” Turkish age on the Hungarian frontier and in the Balkans with regards 
to captivity see Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, eds., Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
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focused studies.6 The rough outlines of  the system, however, can be drawn. 
As a result of  the evolution of  standing armies after the Treaty of  Westphalia 
(1648) and the limited wars of  the eighteenth century, warfare tended to show a 
“milder” face. The armies were paid, fed and clothed in a more regular way than 
they had been during the long and brutal Thirty Years War. During the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, when wars were already being fought by professional 
mercenary armies, it was common practice to press captured mercenaries into the 
service of  their captor. It was almost daily routine during the Thirty Years War, 
although this custom had gradually disappeared by the end of  the seventeenth 
century, parallel with the evolution of  the new standing armies, though as late as 
1756, Frederick the Great attempted to press the whole encircled and captured 
Saxon army into the Prussian army. In the eighteenth century, however, the 
exchange of  prisoners became common practice and even the primary practice 
when dealing with soldiers who had been taken captive. Before or during a 
campaign, the opposing commanders (or even rulers) concluded an official 
agreement, the so called cartel, which regulated the quotas and set the terms. 
Moreover, committees were formed to supervise the process and overcome the 
difficulties. These committees consisted of  officers and commissaries from both 
parties. The basic rule of  the exchange was reciprocity, but sometimes it proved 
to be impossible: generally one belligerent had more prisoners than the other, 
or one had captured more officers etc. To address these differences, various 
kinds of  quotas were established. For example, one sergeant “counted” as two 
privates and a lieutenant as twelve; a colonel was worth as much as 48 men.7 
The old habits of  ransoming were still alive in an altered form: a prisoner in the 
middle of  the eighteenth century could hope that his state would agree to pay 
the ransom, knowing, however, that this sum might be deducted from his future 
pay.8 For a captured high-ranking general one could ask a huge prize. During the 
Seven Years War (1756–63), in the conflicts between Prussia and Austria a Field-
Marshall could be ransomed for 15,000 Gulden or exchanged for 3,000 privates.9 
The fates of  the prisoners were also determined by the circumstances of  
their captivity. This period was famous for sophisticated siege warfare. When 
6  Christopher Duffy, The military experience in the Age of  Reason (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1987), 
257–58; Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of  War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 66–72; Lutz 
Voigtländer, Die preußischen Kriegsgefangenen der Reichsarmee. 1760–1763 (Duisburg: Gilles & Francke, 1995).
7  Stefan Smid, Der Spanische Erbfolgekrieg (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), 159–61.
8  Creveld, The Transformation of  War, 69.
9  Christopher Duffy, Sieben Jahre Krieg. 1756–1763. Die Armee Maria Theresias (Vienna: Heeresgeschichtliches 
Museum–Militärwissenschaftliches Institut, 2003), 177. 
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a commander and the garrison of  a besieged fortress had fulfilled their duty 
but nonetheless been compelled to capitulate, their performances were usually 
acknowledged in the document of  the capitulation, which might even grant 
them free leave with or without arms. Sometimes they had to give their word 
not to fight for a year or so. If  captivity was nevertheless unavoidable, in such 
documents the circumstances of  the arrest―especially for officers who had been 
captured―were also regulated.
As armies and warfare evolved, international law began to put down modest 
roots. In 1625, Hugo Grotius had stated, “[i]t has long been a maxim, universally 
received among the powers of  Christendom, that prisoners of  war cannot be 
made slaves, so as to be sold, or compelled to the hardships and labor attached 
to slavery.”10 Grotius’ thesis was widely known throughout Europe by the Age 
of  Enlightenment. 
This protection, though based on moral, unwritten law and habits, obviously 
did not apply to the Turkish prisoners during the wars of  liberation at the end 
of  the seventeenth century. On the contrary, the captured Turks could be freely 
bought and sold. The Ottomans and mostly their tributaries, the Crimean Tartars, 
also made a huge profit from the ransoms that were paid by Christians to free 
prisoners.11 The Peace of  Karlowitz (1699) marked the end of  this practice. The 
12th point of  the treaty declared that all prisoners should be mutually released.12 
The Treaty of  Passarowitz, which restored the territory of  the Kingdom of  
Hungary (1718), included this stipulation, but when an enemy of  the Sultan 
had been less successful, the Porte showed little interest in returning prisoners 
who had already been sold. After the Treaty of  Belgrade (1739), the difference 
between the fates of  the Russian and the Austrian prisoners was striking. The 
former were released relatively quickly without ransom, and sometimes the Porte 
even bought back them from private hands in order to release them. Of  the 
Austrian prisoners, the state-owned galley rowers were released, but others were 
enslaved until as late as the 1750s, and Austrian diplomats and monks from the 
Trinitarian Order continued to pay ransom for them. The explanation for this 
different approach is simple. The Russians had scored considerable successes 
10  On the laws of  war and peace (accessed January 28, 2015), http://www.constitution.org/gro/
djbp_307.htm.
11  Will Smiley, “Let Whose People Go? Subjecthood, Sovereignty, Liberation, and Legalism in 
Eighteenth-Century Russo–Ottoman Relations,” Turkish Historical Review 3 (2012): 201.
12  Acsády Ignácz, A karloviczi béke története 1699, Értekezések a történelmi tudományok köréből 18 
(Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1899), 348.
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during the war, taking thousands of  Turkish prisoners, but the Austrians had 
mostly suffered setbacks.13 
After almost half  a century of  peace, a new war threatened to break out 
in the Danube Valley. In accordance with the Russo–Austrian treaty of  1781, 
Joseph II—rather unwillingly—had to declare war on the Ottomans after a 
Turkish “aggression” against Russia in August 1787, though as historians have 
persuasively argued, the Sultan was continuously provoked by the Russians. 
The Czarina, motivated by the Polish precedent, had ambitious plans for the 
partitioning of  the Ottoman Empire, and Joseph felt that he had to keep peace 
with the Russians (who he felt were likely to win), although Vienna had had good 
relations with Constantinople since the 1740s. But at the beginning of  February 
1788, war was formerly declared. The Austrians had a very cautious operation 
plan whereby six army or independent corps were to be deployed along the 
Turkish border. The main army (under Field-Marshall Lacy), concentrated 
around Zimony (Zemun, in Serbia), tried to capture Belgrade, while the corps 
of  Slavonia and Croatia invaded Bosnia from the valleys of  the Una and Sava 
Rivers. On the other side of  the Danube River, a corps covered the Banat. A 
weak corps protected Transylvania, while the army of  Prince Friedrich Josias of  
Sachsen-Coburg, in cooperation with the Russians, operated from Galicia and 
Bukovina in the direction of  Moldau and later Wallachia.14 
Rules regarding Prisoners
As in almost every walk of  life, Joseph II was not satisfied with the traditions, habits 
and unwritten laws of  the past in the case of  the captured Turks. The problems 
with regard to Turkish prisoners first came up in a report from Bukovina. On 
March 5, 1788, Prince Coburg put a question to the Aulic War Council in Vienna 
(Wiener Hofkriegsrat). Coburg wanted to know what kind of  provisions were due 
to the recently captured Ottomans. How much money should be spent on food 
and accommodation? Should bread be issued in kind or in cash? Field-Marshall 
Graf  Andreas Hadik, President of  the War Council, faced the task of  finding 
solutions to this problem. Hadik wrote a note to Emperor Joseph II on March 
20, 1788 in which he declared, “searching in the old files of  the previous war 
13  Will Smiley, “The Meanings of  Conversion: Treaty Law, State Knowledge, and Religious Identity 
among Russian Captives in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” The International History Review 34 
(2012): 3–4.
14  Hochedlinger, Austria’s War, 382–84.
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in the archive, we could find no specific information about this question [that 
of  providing sustenance and lodging for Turkish prisoners].” Some scattered 
information was be found, however, according to which the high-ranking 
Turkish prisoners were simply to be exchanged for captured Christians as soon 
as possible. One could also claim a significant sum of  money (Ranzionirungs 
Geld), as much as 100 Ducats or more. The “temporary” costs of  these persons 
were covered by the Court Chamber (the main financial organ of  the empire), 
and these expanses were to be added to the ransom. The common Ottoman 
soldiers were nevertheless delivered to imperial officers as servant, handed over 
to galley, or assigned other compulsory labor.15
All in all, Hadik had not found satisfactory solutions from the past regarding 
provisions for and treatment of  the Ottoman prisoners. He asked for a resolution 
to this problem from the sovereign. In the end, it was Joseph who had to make 
the decision, which he composed immediately on Hadik’s note. Interestingly, 
this new regulation was a mix of  the mentality of  the Enlightenment and the 
habits of  the past. According to the imperial resolution, four categories were 
established, to which the captured Ottoman soldiers were to be assigned. The 
main principle of  this categorization was the religion of  the person captured. In 
the case of  a Muslim prisoner, he should receive a supply of  4 Kreuzers daily in 
cash, together with one ordinary portion (one pound) of  bread. These conditions 
were the same in the case of  Prussians who had been captured (during the war 
of  1778–79) and French prisoners taken five years later.16
At the same time, a Christian who was an Ottoman subject and had taken 
up arms against the Imperial troops was to be pressed into the army. These 
people were sent to distant garrisons on the other side of  the empire in order 
to ensure that they would not be able to escape. If  a prisoner were found unfit 
for military service, he was to be assigned some kind of  “public work.” The 
Emperor cautioned captors to be watchful, “because the Ottomans dress the 
Christians just as they dress the Turks, so one must inspect them closely [i. e. 
medically to determine whether the prisoner had been circumcised or not].” 
15  Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Haus- Hof  und Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv. Wiener 
Hofkriegsrat, Hauptreihe [hereafter KA HKR] 1788-33-1 (i.e. year of  the creation of  the document/
number of  the archival rubric /serial number of  the document).
16  Lenkefi Ferenc, Kakas a kasban. Francia hadifoglyok Magyarországon az első koalíciós háború idején, 1793–
1797 (Budapest: Petit Real, 2000), 41. 
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Christians who were not Ottoman subjects17 but had fought against the 
Imperial troops fell into the third category. They were to be interrogated as to 
their names and the details concerning their families and then sent to lifelong 
ship-hauling, the same fate as suffered by notorious criminals. Finally, Joseph 
ordered captured deserters (former Austrian soldiers) who had been captured 
were to be court-martialled immediately.18 
There were also questions regarding the status of  and provisions for 
captured Turkish officers.19 After a short hesitation, the Emperor acknowledged 
their status as if  they were European “guests.” The commander of  the Main 
Army, the pedant and hard-working Field Marshall Moritz Lacy, soon compiled 
a comprehensive breakdown of  the ranks in the Ottoman Army and made a 
proposal concerning provisions for the captured officers. The highest rank on 
Lacy’s list was the Bin baschi, “commander of  a detached corps,” who would 
receive 24 florins every month, just like a Janissary Aga or a Sipahi Aga, though 
no one would receive more than one portion of  bread daily. Joseph accepted the 
proposal on April 30 in the camp at Zimony.20 
One additional question remained to be addressed. What if  one of  the 
Muslim prisoners wanted to convert to the Christian faith? According to an 
imperial resolution, which was transmitted by an order from Hadik to the 
General Commando in Buda, if  somebody “of  his own will” declared his 
intention to convert, he had to be furnished with the necessary requisites and 
then released as a free man. His freedom, however, would not last not long. If  
the proselyte proved fit for military service, he was to be drafted immediately. 
Were he deemed unfit for military service, the “new citizen” would be settled 
far from the border and would be allowed to earn a living.21 Thus converting 
17  Several European (mainly French) mercenaries served in the Ottoman Army as artillerymen or 
military engineers. 
18  It was transmitted to the troops by an order of  the Aulic War Council dated April 11, 1788. KA HKR 
1788-33-1. 
19  The question came up after the report of  the Croatian Corps after the affair of  Dresnik, where two 
Agas had been captured and the Aulic War Council was inquired about their supply (Lacy’s note to the 
emperor. KA HKR 1788-33-5.).
20  Ibid. 
21  Hadik’s order to the Hungarian General Commando. Vienna,  September 4, 1788. HM Hadtörténelmi 
Levéltár (Budapest), Magyarországi Főhadparancsnokság – General Commando in Ungarn (hereafter G. 
C.) 1788-36-68. (i.e. year of  the creation of  the document/number of  the archival rubric /serial number 
of  the document).
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the faith meant becoming the subject of  the Hungarian king just like centuries 
earlier.22
Very few prisoners actually chose to convert during their relatively short 
period of  imprisonment, although the Austrian bureaucracy probably registered 
every case. It is also not surprising that captives, who were accommodated in the 
crowded fortress of  Munkács (Mukacseve, Ukraine), where health conditions 
were hardly optimal, were perfectly willing to convert to Roman Catholicism if  
it meant getting out of  the prison in the fortress.23
Falling into Captivity
The first large group of  Turkish prisoners was captured in the siege of  Szabács 
(Šabac, Serbia). This small, desolate fortress next to the river Sava River was in 
key position for every movement against Belgrade. Joseph himself  conducted 
the siege, which started on April 20. The bombardment began immediately and 
in the early morning of  April 24, the Austrian infantry made an assault against 
a breach. After having put up fierce resistance, the defenders were compelled to 
withdraw to the small inner fortress. Finally, on April 26, the garrison of  Szabács 
capitulated.24 The Austrians captured three Turkish senior officers (a Janissary 
Aga and two other commanders: Achi Akbar and Achi Ibrahim), 33 officers, 32 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and 617 privates. In the fortress there were 
13 Greek-Christians (three merchants and 10 servants, “Knechte”) and five Jews. 
In the terms of  capitulation, the bellicose Joseph acknowledged the gallant 
and “soldier-like” behaviour of  the Turkish defenders. Some officers were 
allowed to leave temporally on parole to take care of  their families. The officers 
were allowed to wear their swords and keep their horses. The prisoners were 
transported to the Fortress of  Pétervárad (Petrovaradin, Serbia) and later taken 
to Arad, Szeged and Károlyváros (Karlovac, Croatia) “at the cost of  the state,” 
as Joseph emphasized to Chancellor Kaunitz.25 Ultimately the prisoners from 
22  Géza Pálffy, “Ransom slavery along the Ottoman-Hungarian frontier in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries,” in Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders, ed. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor  (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 
54.
23  On January 4, 1789, the Invalid Commando from Munkács reported to Buda about a newly converted 
prisoner, who nevertheless soon died. G. C. Department I [hereafter Dep.] 70 Book, number of  registration 
[hereafter no.] 1789-488.
24  Jenő Gyalókay, „Šabac vára 1787–88-ban,” Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 25 (1924): 205–19.
25  Adolf  Beer, ed., Joseph II.: Leopold II. und Kaunitz. Ihr Briefwechsel (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1873), 
289.
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Szabács were accommodated in Szeged (in the barracks of  the so called Invaliden 
Commando) and the fortress of  Arad. The former was designated for the officers 
and the latter for the NCOs and commoners. 
In the case of  the Christians and Jews who were captured in Szabács, their 
captors did not deliver the daily portion of  bread, but rather gave them on the 4 
Kreuzers they had been promised. In the case of  Muslim prisoners, however, the 
regulations that had been set by Joseph and Lacy were followed.26 
The Imperial generosity after the capitulation of  Szabács soon caused 
problems. On July 4, Field-Marshall Lacy informed the Hungarian General 
Commando that the prisoners who had been released on parole had failed to 
return, so their comrades (i. e. their bailsmen), whom “they had left behind 
perfidiously,” had to put in irons, accommodated in the casemates and assigned 
to compulsory labor. They were allowed only to write one (and only one) letter 
regarding what had befallen them. Naturally their swords and knives were taken 
away and their horses were sold if  their masters were unable to cover the costs of  
their sustenance. Other problems must have arisen, because Lacy reminded the 
commanders of  Szeged and Arad of  their responsibility regarding the excesses 
and misdeeds of  the Turkish prisoners. The Field-Marshall finally demanded that 
not only the names of  the deceased prisoners but also the causes of  their deaths 
be reported to the Main Army Headquarters.27 Later in the autumn of  1788 
Joseph strictly forbade all form of  release on parole, and no requests for parole 
were allowed either, “because the Turkish prisoners are supplied everything that 
they need.”28
The second and third batch of  prisoners was sent by Field-Marshall Gedeon 
Loudon, commander of  the corps in Croatia and Slavonia. The little fortress of  
Dubica (Dubica, Bosnia and Herzegovina) at the river Una was encircled and 
later besieged from the middle of  April. Having taken over command, Loudon 
had immediately started the bombardment on Dubica on August 18, 1788. The 
defenders soon were compelled to surrender. The Turkish commander tried to 
convince Loudon to grant the garrison free leave, but he rejected their entreaties 
26  Field-Marshall Lacy’s order to the Banatian and the Hungarian General Commando. Zimony, on 1 
May. G. C. 1788-36-10.
27  Janissary Aga Mehmed and Kadi Ibrahim were exempted from punishment because of  their services 
maintaining order and administration; furthermore, they had not been the guarantors of  their comrades 
who had been released on parole. G. C. 1788-33-36. Zimony, on July 4. The General Commando forwarded 
the orders to Arad and Szeged on July 9.
28  Hadik to the Hungarian General Commando, Vienna, October 13. 1788-33-124.
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and the 414 Ottoman soldiers29 were taken prisoner, although like Joseph at 
Szabács, in the terms of  capitulation Loudon acknowledged their courage and 
endurance: “Dubica is now just a heap of  stone and the disgusting smell of  dead 
bodies and horses and cattle carcasses within make it hard to believe that the 
garrison was able to defend it for so long.”30 The officers were allowed the keep 
their sabers, and Loudon promised to take care of  the wounded and sick Turkish 
soldiers in hospitals. The women and children who were found in Dubica were 
sent to inner Bosnia.31 The Turkish prisoners from Dubica were escorted to 
Gradisca (Nova Gradiška, Croatia) in Slavonia, where they remained until at 
least September 3, and then some time were taken to Hungary. We know only 
scattered details of  their fates after this because of  the sources.32 One transport 
was taken to the small but famous fortress of  Szigetvár.33 The other half  of  
them may have been escorted to Győr.
The next victim of  the energetic and aggressive Loudon was the fortress of  
Novi (Novi Bosanski in Bosnia and Herzegovina), which was also situated near 
the Una River. The defenders again put up significant resistance and the first 
storming of  the walls, which took place on September 21, was repulsed. The 
Austrian artillery nevertheless continued the siege and within a week the little 
fortress had been completely ruined. On October 3, the garrison capitulated.34 In 
Novi, Loudon took 590 Ottoman soldiers prisoner (566 Turks and 24 Vlachs).35 
The question of  their accommodation, however, created difficulties because 
of  the deteriorating military situation. Taking advantage of  the slowness and 
hesitation of  the Austrian main army, which had been delayed near Belgrade, 
the Turks won the initiative. They had crossed the Danube River at Vidin and 
29  Precisely 2 Beys, 18 Agas, 24 Barjaktars (Standard-bearer), 4 Chehajas (Adjutant), 34 Odobashas 
(Sergeant), 19 Chauses (Corporals) and 313 Prostis (Commoners). Five Turks were allowed to stay back 
on Parole to escort the women and children. The Turkish commander was responsible for their return. 45 
soldiers were wounded or sick and there were eight Christians in service of  the Ottomans: two servants and 
six soldiers (Loudon’s report to Joseph. Dubica, August 27. KA HKR 1788-33-42).
30  Ibid.
31  Criste, Kriege 167–68.
32  The bulk of  the archival material of  the Aulic War Council was ruthlessly discarded after 1815. Many 
of  the documents of  the Hungarian General Commando were also damaged or destroyed during the 
Second World War.  
33  During the siege of  this fortress in 1566, the Ottoman ruler, Sultan Suleiman I. the “Great” died. The 
fortress is also famous for the heroic assault led by the Hungarian national hero, Miklós Zrínyi, during the 
same campaign. 
34  Criste, Kriege 168–69.
35  Including the commander of  the fortress, Pasha Agi [sic!] Mehmed, and 7 Agas. KA HKR 1788-33-
65. 
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pushed back the Austrian army corps. Accompanied by 20,000 soldiers, Joseph 
rushed to defend the border at the Banat. At the end of  September, his army was 
almost encircled by the enemy and Joseph ordered a withdrawal. At Karánsebes 
(Caransebeş, Romania) on the night of  September 21, this movement changed 
to panic. The army retreated as far as Lugos (Lugoj, Romania). The imperial high 
command had good reason to fear the invasion of  Banat, Transylvania or even 
southern Hungary. 
In the middle of  August, Joseph ordered that the prisoners be transported 
deeper into Hungary, specifically to Nagyvárad (Oradea, Romania). He also got 
the casern of  Nagyvárad made suitable to provide lodging for the prisoners. 
Joseph also directed that “prisoners, who must do compulsory labor, should 
be treated the same way in Nagyvárad as they are in Arad and Szeged.”36 
Nevertheless, until mid-autumn this order was only partially executed. 
At the beginning of  November 1788, the prisoners from Novi were sent to 
Arad and Szeged, so the initial fear of  a Turkish invasion had already faded. The 
prisoners of  Szabács must have been in Arad and Szeged already, because both 
places were described as “overcrowded,” like Szigetvár. Joseph finally decided that 
the prisoners from Novi had to be accommodated somewhere in northeastern 
Hungary, and Huszt (Khust, Ukraine), Szolnok, Ungvár (Uzhhorod, Ukraine), 
and Munkács were raised as possible destinations.37 In the end, most of  them 
were taken to the fortress (and prison) of  Munkács. 
The Fate of  the Prisoners in Hungary
The first Turkish prisoners of  war (at the beginning only eight men) were held 
captive in the Fortress of  Arad (Arad, Romania). In a short time, problems 
arose concerning provisions for them. On April 8, General Vinzenz Barco, the 
commanding general in Hungary, reported from Buda to Vienna on the problems 
faced by the fortress commandant of  Arad. Except for bread, the Turkish 
prisoners were not willing to eat anything that had been touched by Christian 
hands, so he had had to supply them with firewood so that they would be able to 
cook themselves. Furthermore, the Turks had wanted to eat warm meals twice 
a day. Barco and the commandant of  Arad sought a “highest resolution” on 
this question before more prisoners arrived. On April 17, the War Council sent 
36  Pancsova, (Pančevo, Serbia) on 16 August 1788. HL G. C. 1788-36-59. The order of  the emperor was 
transmitted by the General Commando to Szeged, Arad and Nagyvárad on August 20. 1788.  
37  Lacy to the General Commando. Zimony, on November 6, 1788. KA HKR 1788-33-60.
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an order according to which, apart from the daily one pound of  bread and 4 
Kreuzers, nothing should be given to the Turks.38 Interestingly, when there were 
several hundred prisoners in Arad and other places, Joseph changed his mind. 
On May 10, the emperor permitted the fortress commandant to supply them 
with firewood, but the Turks had to be satisfied with the “ordinary” portion and 
cook together.39 
The issue of  providing accommodation for the Turkish prisoners also caused 
headaches for the military and civil officials of  the fortresses and municipalities. 
In Győr, at the end of  1788, the first suggestion regarding accommodation for 
these 500 men40 was to designate the empty college building of  the suppressed 
Jesuit order for this purpose. This project failed because of  the poor condition 
of  the building. Finally, the decision was made to use the newly built casern to 
house the Turkish prisoners, but one company of  Austrian soldiers which had 
guarded the prisoners had to take lodging in private domiciles in the city.41 
At the beginning, the prisoners enjoyed “too much freedom” in Győr, as the 
War Council put it. Some Turks were allowed to go out into the city and walk the 
streets with lit pipes hanging from their mouths and wearing their sabers at their 
sides. Keeping their swords was the orderly privileges of  the Turkish officers, 
granted by the document of  capitulation of  Dubica, but the private Turks also 
carried long knives with them, according to the complaints. The emperor forbade 
these practices and ordered that the Turks not leave the casern and that any and 
all knives be taken from the privates and only given back temporally when they 
were needed to “slice the meat.”42
The long winter and the crowded conditions in the casern soon took their 
toll. On February 10, 1789, the commander of  the Lacy regiment reported to 
the Hungarian General Commando that 34 Turks (of  the 610 prisoners) had 
died of  some “extraordinary diseases,” despite the efforts of  the regiment’s 
medical staff. The command therefore requested that no more prisoners be sent 
to Győr and that a military hospital be established near the city. In answer, the 
General Commando praised the regiment’s command for its efforts and offered 
38  KA HKR 1788-33-2. Vienna, April 17. 
39  Hadik’s order to General Commando,Vienna, May 10. G. C. 1788-36-15. I found no other hint in the 
sources about the religious activity of  the Muslim prisoners.
40  This figure is from a report of  the Lacy regiment’s command. HL G. C. Dep. I Book 70. No. 1789-16.
41  HL G. C. Dep. I. Book 70. no. 1789-168.
42  Dated in Vienna on January 31, 1789. KA HL 1789-33-7. 
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the reassurance that no more prisoners would be sent to Győr, but rejected the 
idea of  establishing a hospital.43
The presence of  the prisoners in Győr raised other problems. The city was 
situated on the main communication road of  the Danube River valley, so Joseph 
found it problematic to station numerous captured enemies there. On March 26, 
1789 Hadik (according to the emperor’s note) instructed the Hungarian General 
Commando to take the prisoners to the fortress of  Lipótvár (Leopoldov, 
Slovakia) in the northwest of  Hungary.44 Hadik also ordered the expansion of  
the available building in order to accommodate possible transports in the future. 
Arrangements had to be made to provide lodging not only for the prisoners, but 
also for the soldiers (generally invalids) who would stand guard. In the case of  
Lipótvár, the nearby city of  Nagyszombat (Trnava, Slovakia) was designated to 
accommodate the guards. 
The order of  Hadik was executed rather slowly indeed. The General 
Commando had had one group of  prisoners transferred to Székesfehérvár earlier 
in April. On  May 6, the Aulic Council made its resolution clear. The emperor 
again ordered the immediate transfer of  all of  the prisoners to Lipótvár.45 
Consequently, several hundred Turks made a long detour to Székesfehérvár on 
their way to Lipótvár.
In Szigetvár, the responsible guard unit was compelled to report “great 
unrest” among the 266 Turkish prisoners from Dubica, who had demanded more 
freedoms.46 The cause of  this unrest their loss of  the right to go into the town 
from the fortress. It was Joseph who had prohibited this, not only for the Turks 
in Győr but for every prisoner of  war in Hungary. The former commanders of  
the garrison, including three agas, submitted a written complaint to the emperor 
in which they quoted the promises they had received from Loudon at the 
capitulation of  Dubica. Joseph, however, insisted that every Turkish prisoner 
was to be given the same treatment. Besides, as the order of  the Aulic War 
43  HL G. C. Dep. I. Book 70. No. 1789-1214. 
44  For this purpose, the name of  the former Franciscan cloister in Dejte (Dechtice, Slovakia) next to 
Nagyszombat was also mentioned, in which 400 prisoners would have been accommodated. The costs of  
the renovation finally deterred the General Commando from the project. The little fortress of  Trencsén 
(Trenčín, Slovakia) was also a candidate, but the high water in the river Vág (Waag) made transport to it 
impossible. (Report of  the Hungarian General Commando to the War Council, Buda, April 18, 1789. KA 
HKR 1789-33-50).
45  KA HKR 1789-33-55.
46  Report of  the General Commando to the War Council in enclosure the complaint letter of  the Turks 
dated April 30, 1789, Buda. KA HKR 1789-33-54. 
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Council to Szigetvár stated: “We have to make it clear to these agas that prisoners 
in our hands are treated more humanely than prisoners on the other side, so they 
had better stay calm.” In the same letter, the War Council ordered the guard in 
Szigetvár through the General Commando to take strict measures if  necessary 
in order to prevent further unrest.47 
In Munkács, in addition to the small rooms of  the fortress, houses in the small 
town were also requisitioned for this purpose, so the General Commando had 
to engage in lengthy correspondence with the County of  Bereg and its vicecomes. 
According to a November 4 report to the General Commando (Munkács), the 
fortress of  Munkács and the neighboring Palanka casern could accommodate 
only 345 prisoners and a guard of  120 men, not the required 645 prisoners 
and 283 men. The rest had to be billeted in the domiciles of  burghers until the 
necessary renovations of  the fortress and the casern were completed.48 
Within six months, however, it became clear that Munkács was not suitable 
for the accommodation of  hundreds of  prisoners. As had been the case in Győr, 
epidemics broke out, and the “awkwardness of  having these people watched over 
by invalid soldiers and the resulting concerns about desertion” prompted the 
President of  the War Council to propose a move to the casern in Kassa (Kosice, 
Slovakia) and to keep Munkács in reserve should 150 new prisoners arrive.49 
Joseph agreed to the transfer, but he ordered that, in addition to Munkács, other 
places in Hungary be prepared to accommodate future transports. The move to 
Kassa took place at the end of  June.50 
One of  the best indicators concerning the conditions under which these 
prisoners lived is their mortality rate. Despite the regular supply of  provisions, 
the mortality rate was high according to any kind of  modern standard. From 
September 1, 1788 to December 31, 1789, it was seven percent (of  281 prisoners, 
20 died) in Szigetvár. In Lipótvár this figure was 5.5 percent (31 of  560), but in 
the case of  Kassa the losses were enormous: 21 percent (168 of  791).51 Later, 
one could include the casualties of  the infamous prison of  Munkács, where 
unfortunate prisoners spent several months. The high mortality rate, however, 
was caused by conditions at the time, not by punishment or negligence. 
47  Vienna, May 6, 1789. KA HKR 1789-33-54.
48  HL G. C. 1788-16-1346. 
49  Vienna, June 3, 1789. KA HKR 1789-33-78.
50  On June 27, the Invalid Commando in Kassa reported to the General Commando on the arrival and 
accommodation of  the Turkish prisoners. They were being lodged in the casern and the nearby building of  
a former monastery. HL G. C. I. Dep. Book 71. No. 1789-5137.
51 According to the total account on the Turkish prisoners of  war. KA HKR 1790-33-132.
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“The Most Important Duty” – Guarding the Prisoners
The old and neglected buildings were not simply uncomfortable and unhealthy, 
they also raised serious security questions. The other problem was the 
composition of  the guards who were responsible for watching the prisoners. The 
superannuated soldiers of  the different Invaliden Commandos and the members of  
second-rate troop units like the garrison regiments and the staff-regiment were 
not always up to the task. However they received full pay while serving as guards. 
On the night of  November 8, 1788, four Turkish prisoners escaped from 
the Palanka casern. They managed to hide in the forests for several months. The 
commander of  the fortress received a strict rebuke from the General Commando 
because of  “his carelessness in his most important duty, which is guarding these 
prisoners.”52 
There were other prison breaks too, of  which the emperor demanded 
immediate and accurate account. On September 30, 1788, the General 
Commando reported to the Aulic War Council that two Turks had escaped from 
Lipótvár. They had not gotten far and were soon caught and brought back by the 
peasants. The fugitives were held under arrest until the emperor decided their 
fates. In his note about the case, as regards the punishment Hadik reminded 
Joseph of  two other precedents: captured deserters from Zamość (see below) 
had had to do compulsory labor in chains, which were also worn in the night. 
First of  all, “without any lengthy inquiry” they received “a certain number of  
strokes with the stick because that is the habit in this kind of  case, which is 
very common in wars.” Hadik obviously regarded these as cases of  desertion. 
In Munkács, the fugitives, who had already been captured and condemned to 
compulsory labor (digging entrenchments), had contemplated another plot to 
escape, so the final sentence in their case was ship-hauling, and they were each 
assigned to one of  four different sites distant from one another. Hadik then 
asked for a resolution in the case of  the fugitives, assuring the emperor that the 
question of  who bore responsibility for the prison break in Lipótvár would be 
examined by the General Commando. The imperial resolution was short: “they 
are sentenced to ship-hauling.”53
All in all, guarding the Turkish prisoners was not a rewarding task. On 24, 
February 1789, all of  the 31 Turks in the Galician fortress of  Zamość (today 
52  HL G. C. I. Dep. Book 70. No. 1788-276.
53  Hadik’s note dated October 8, Vienna. KA HKR 1789-33-154.
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Poland) managed to escape with the help of  a soldier they had bribed, a private 
from the 1st Garrison Regiment. The latter was court-martialed and executed, 
but the garrison-commandant, Major Marquis de Torres, was also sentenced to 
a 14-day arrest according to the order of  Joseph because “he did not personally 
take care of  the gate key.” Torres also had to pay the calculated ransom for the 
31 fugitives. The commanding general of  Galicia also received a slight rebuke, 
because Zamość was deemed a bad choice as a place to hold prisoners, since it 
is situated too close to the border.54
At the beginning of  the war, Joseph and his military advisors might have 
expected a “flood of  prisoners” following the Austrian successes. This did not 
come to pass. Four years later, however, Munkács, Arad, Szeged and some other 
places in the Kingdom of  Hungary nonetheless had to accommodate thousands 
of  prisoners. These prisoners, however, were not faithful Muslims, but rather 
enthusiastic French patriots or even Jacobins.55 
Exchange of  Prisoners 
On October 27, from Zimony Joseph replied to an enquiry by Loudon: 
“The proposal [made by the Turks] concerning the exchange of  prisoners 
can be made, but not as the Turks have envisioned, i.e. not one for one, which 
would mean one officer for one private and vice versa. This exchange must only 
be made such that officers are exchanged for officers or, according to the 
circumstances and the rank of  the officer, 3, 6, 9 or more privates [should be 
given] for one officer.”56
 Joseph then designated the commander of  the Austrian troops in Beschania 
to supervise the exchange of  prisoners, and he had Loudon suggest to the Turks 
that the Pasha of  Belgrade be the person responsible for the exchanges on the 
Turkish side. 
However, a larger and centrally organized exchange of  prisoners did not 
actually take place for one year. The cause of  this delay must have been the 
“forgetfulness” of  the prisoners of  Szabács, Novi and Dubica who had been 
released on parole. Not one of  them returned to the Austrians. The punishments 
that were inflicted on their comrades and bailsmen were to no avail. The 
exchange might have been complicated or hindered by the inconsistency of  
54  The imperial manuscript dated March 20, 1789, from Vienna, KA HKR 1788-33-32. 
55  On the French prisoner in Hungary between 1793–1797 See Lenkefi, Kakas a kasban.
56  KA HKR 1788-33-61.
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Turkish customs concerning prisoners, which I will discuss later. Briefly, there 
were simply not enough Austrian prisoners of  war at the same time and same 
places (near the frontline and not in the distant Constantinople) to provide a 
basis for negotiations. 
Along the Croat and Slavonic Militärgrenz (Military Border), low-scale 
exchanges might have been quite common, but these cases effected exclusively 
Grenzers and generally only involved a small number of  men. The Turks and the 
Grenzers often had prisoners on hand because of  the endless raids on both sides 
of  the cordon. Nevertheless, cattle, oxen, and horses always represented a far 
more valuable target.57 Sometimes, this kind of  affair was similar to kidnapping 
and blackmailing. Sources suggest that once it even came to pass that marauding 
Turks captured the wife of  a Grenzer in the district of  Brod. They demanded 
not only one Turkish prisoner for the women, but also 45 florins. The transaction 
was concluded, but the poor family of  the Grenzer had not been able to pay 
the ransom, so the money was finally paid from the cash register of  the Broder 
canton. This rather trivial case had come before the Emperor in the form of  
a note from the President of  the War Council. Joseph had been angry: “It is 
nonsense that we exchanged a soldier for a woman and that, in addition, 10 
Ducats was also paid. The man who arranged this ransom without preliminary 
consent has to pay the 10 Ducats. The War Council will have to see to it.” 58
In the end, the first step towards a regular prisoner exchange was taken by 
the Turks. The beg of  Ostrožac (Bosnia), Mustafa Besirevich, wrote a proposal 
on August 21, 1789 to his “Dearest Neighbor,” Vice-Colonel Matthias Rukavina, 
commander of  the Oguliner Border Regiment, about a “general prisoner 
exchange” and in particular about the possibility of  exchanging a captured 
Grenzer officer (Lieutenant Phillipovich) for a certain Mustafa Cserich Beg, 
who was himself  the brother of  the Beg of  Ostrožac. As the letter revealed, 
earlier Rukavina had made an offer to ransom Phillipovich for cash, but the Beg 
realized he had an opportunity to get back his brother. This personal bias was a 
significant help to the cause of  the exchange, but first  the Beg had to remedy 
the problems concerning Turks of  Novi and Dubica who had been released on 
parole but who had not returned.59 The Beg suggested in his letter to Rukavina 
57  František Vaníček: Specialgeschichte der Militärgrenze, vol. 3 (Vienna: Kaiserlich-Königliche Hof- 
und Staatsdruckerei, 1875), 402–04. 
58  Vienna, on May 4, 1789. KA HKR 1789-33-59.
59  These missing prisoners from Sabać, did not come up in this case. Maybe these people were hopelessly 
out of  the way for a Bosnian Beg. 
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that if  the proposed exchange were to be successful, the “perfidious” Turks, 
about 30 people, would hardly go back. Rather, they would probably buy and 
send home Christian prisoners to secure their release once and for all. If  the 
exchange were not to take place, the Beg was willing to turn to the Grand Vizier 
to ask for his assistance.60 
Put simply, under the pretext of  a “general exchange” the Beg of  Ostrožac 
wanted to get back his brother. His proposal, however, may have met with 
Vienna’s interest because providing sustenance and accommodation for more 
than 1,500 prisoners in Hungary alone would have represented a significant 
burden to the state. So Joseph willingly permitted the “general exchange” as 
soon as he got some compensation (albeit in the form of  faint guarantees) for 
the missing Turks of  Novi and Dubica. The proposal of  the Beg of  Ostrožac 
also suggests that earlier some of  the border guards (Grenzers) had broken the 
pledges (“good faith”) that they had made to the Turks promising that they would 
return shortly with the ransom. Some of  them had simply fled. The emperor 
agreed to release one Turkish prisoner for every Austrian soldier who had been 
released by the Turks after having pledged to return shortly with his ransom but 
who had then broken his word and never returned. Joseph also permitted Field 
Marshall-lieutenant Christoph Wallisch, commander of  the Croatian corps who 
was in charge of  taking some of  the prisoners from Hungary to Croatia, to ease 
the approaching exchanges. He ordered, however, that he give specific details 
concerning accomodation and provisions, since “they [the Turkish prisoners] do 
not have the same freedoms as are allowed for prisoners on their side.”61 
Almost one month before the final imperial decision on August 5, 1789, 
Wallisch established an Exchange Committee (Rancionirung Comission) under the 
command of  a Grenz officer colonel (who later that year became a general), 
Daniel Peharnik. The Committee stipulated first and foremost that for the 30 
Turkish prisoners who had been released on parole but who had not returned 
a suitable number of  Austrian prisoners should be released in compensation. 
Furthermore, instead of  strict rules, Colonel Peharnik enjoyed a wide scope of  
authority to judge in every case with regards to how many Turkish privates he 
should exchange for an Austrian officer or NCO (or vice versa). The committee 
would have no say regarding cases in which the process of  ransoming had already 
60  Reports of  the commander of  the corps in Croatia (Field Marshal lieutenant Wallisch) to Emperor 
Joseph (Sluin, on 25 August 1789). KA HKR 1789-33-145.
61  The imperial decision was made on the basis of  the note of  the Feldzeugmester Wallis, vice president 
of  the Aulic War Council. Vienna, on September 30, 1789. KA HKR 1789-33-145.
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began. For example, for Capitan Siegenfeld from the Licca Grenz Regiment the 
emperor had already approved a “ransom of  100 pound in gold and 66 gulden 
in Taller.” A site in Bosnia, Bashina Luca near Dresnik (Drežnik Grad, Croatia), 
was designated for the exchanges as Rancionirungs Platz. Colonel Peharnik would 
have to arrive at an agreement with the enemy about the conditions of  the 
process; for example how strong should the Austrian and Turkish escort be? The 
committee would have to be sure that “[o]n the days of  the exchange process in 
the area of  Dresnik there will be no hostilities or fights, neither from the Turkish 
side nor from our side, but all will remain quiet, peaceful and friendly.”
So as of  the autumn of  1789, the permanent and organized exchanges 
had begun. At the end of  September, Lieutenant Phillipovich was successfully 
exchanged for the Bosnian beg mentioned below. Maybe to show their goodwill, 
on October 8 and 14 ten Grenzers (all private solders) were released by the enemy 
for the 30 frequently mentioned Turks from Novi. 62
Nevertheless, Austrian prisoners who had been captured by the Turks 
somewhere other than the area of  Bosnia and the neighboring Military Border 
seem not to have been considered in the discussions regarding prisoner exchanges. 
In Constantinople in the infamous slave-house Bagno, 17 Austrian officers and 
458 NCOs and privates were lingering in misery in the autumn of  1789.63 The 
president of  the War Council at the time made a logical proposal with regards 
to trying to exchange them for Turkish prisoners in Austrian hands. Hadik was 
also encouraged by the recent exchanges at the Croatian border.64 However, in 
his reply Joseph summarized the problem concerning the issue of  their possible 
exchange, removing the question from the agenda at the same time: 
“The prisoners in Bagno are the propriety of  the Sultan and there is no use 
in having the French ambassador in Constantinople65 to set them free anymore. 
Every person who was captured from our forces by the Bosnians belongs to 
his captor and the Sultan has nothing to do with it, thus the Porte does not 
care about Turks who have been captured by our forces either. Under such 
circumstances, the prisoners in Bagno may have nothing to hope of  from the 
proposal of  the War Council and for the time being there are no further steps 
62  Report of  General Major Peharnik dated October 16, 1789, Sluin. 
63  Report of  two prisoners of  war, Franz Scholderer and György Feleki, captains (both from the Second 
Border Regiment of  Seckler) from Constantinople on September 5 and 7. KA HKR 1789-33-175. 
64  Note of  Hadik to the Emperor. Vienna, October 31. KA HKR 1789-33-175. 
65  The French emissaries (in this case count Marie-Gabriel Choiseul-Gouffier) in Constantinople were 
traditionally the protectors of  the western Christians, especially the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. 
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to be taken with regards to the question of  these prisoners.”66 It was therefore 
also clear to the emperor that the Bosnians must have been interested only in 
their compatriots, so there was only hope for the exchange of  prisoners who had 
belonged to the garrisons of  Novi and Dubica. 
The fortunes of  war following the capture of  Belgrade67 (on 8 October 
1789) by Loudon and the Russo-Austrian successes in Moldau and Wallachia 
had turned to the favor of  Vienna and Saint Petersburg. In 1790, operations 
were conducted primarily in the valley of  Morava and on the Lower Danube 
River, but on a lower scale. Meanwhile, in Vienna Joseph II died on February 
20 of  a pulmonary illness, with which he had been infected in the camp during 
the campaign of  1788. He left his brother Leopold II an exhausted state in the 
throes of  revolt. Leopold’s most vital task was making peace with the Porte 
before Prussia backstabbed the monarchy. On July 27, 1790, an agreement was 
signed with Prussia in which Austria promised peace with the Ottomans on 
the basis of  the status quo ante.68 The war-weary parties concluded an armistice 
in Giurgevo (Giurgiu, Romania) on September 23, 1790. Then, in Svistov 
(Svishtov, Bulgaria) a long peace-conference began. During the Austro-Turkish 
negotiations, Russia continued the war with the Porte, ignoring external pressure 
from other European powers. 
As I have shown, the exchange of  prisoners began in the autumn of  1789 
and by February 1790 almost all of  the prisoners from Novi and Dubica had 
been released in the abovementioned site in Bosnia.69 In return, the Austrians 
got back men from the Border regiments who had been captured, but for the 
time being no one from Constantinople, as Joseph had foreseen. 
On June 17, 1790, Chancellor Kaunitz made an interesting proposal to 
the “Apostolic King” Leopold.70 Kaunitz had spotted in the muster-role one 
qadi and three imams among the prisoners of  Szabács, who were being held in 
Kassa, and two imams in the prison of  Beszterce (Bistrița, Romania). To make 
gestures to the Turks and at the same time to attempt to ease the sufferings of  
the Austrian captivities in Constantinople, the Chancellor suggested releasing 
these six non-combatants without any compensation. According Kaunitz, this 
gesture would also facilitate the task of  Baron Peter Herbert, the Austrian envoy 
66  KA HKR 1789-33-175.
67  Belgrade’s garrison of  8,000 men was granted a free pass. 
68  Hochedlinger, Austria’s War, 393.
69  KA HKR 1790-33-132.
70  He was elected Holy Roman Emperor in October 1790. 
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to the Porte, who was working hard to organize the peace conference at the time. 
The king approved the proposal.71 The War Council ordered the Hungarian and 
the Transylvanian General Commando to release the “literates” and escort them 
to the cordon between the two armies in Serbia and in Wallachia.72 
The very few sources available indicate that as of  the conclusion of  the 
armistice on September 23, there were efforts to exchange the Austrian prisoners 
in Constantinople for the Turks held primarily in Hungary and Transylvania. 
There were hopes that the exchange would include the enslaved peasants taken 
during the war by the Turks. The new president of  the Aulic War Council, 
Cavalry-General Ferdinand von Tige, ordered the commander of  the main 
army in Belgrade, Field-Marshall Michael von Wallis, who also had been recently 
appointed, that he had to take the necessary steps to ensure the return of  the 
Grenzer families, who had been taken during the Turkish raids on Banat and 
southern Transylvania in the autumn of  1788.73 
After the conclusion of  the armistice and even before the opening of  the 
peace conference in Svistov, the parties might have wanted to solve the problem 
of  the prisoners. On September 29, 1790, the War Council demanded from 
the General Commando the “most accurate” account of  the Turkish prisoners 
of  war staying in Hungary because of  the forthcoming “official prisoner 
exchange.”74 On October 4, the commander of  the Main Army, Field Marshall 
Wallis, informed the General Commando from Belgrade that according to Baron 
Herbert, the exchange of  prisoners had to take place before the opening of  
peace conference, so he had to receive the accounts concerning the prisoners as 
soon as possible. Wallis asked for two separate accounts, one for the Christians 
and one for the Muslims. He also asked for a list of  the Turkish women and 
children in captivity.75 
On December 1, Wallis, acting on a suggestion of  Field Marshall-lieutenant 
Enzenberg, reported to the War Council from Belgrade that the focal point of  
71  KA HKR 1790-33-132. 
72  Vienna, June 20. KA HKR 1790-33-132.
73  Vienna, October 24. KA HKR 1790-33-238. This loss was estimated at 36,000 civilians, including 
many thousands who were abducted by the marauding Turks (Hochedlinger, Austria’s war, 384). In this case, 
at the beginning of  January 1791 the Bosnian Turks offered 24 captured women and children for exchange. 
In response to the note of  Tige, Lepold rejected the exchange, stating that a man should not be exchanged 
for a woman. Only Turkish women or children who had been captured should be exchanged for a woman, 
or some money as a ransom (Vienna, January 8, 1791. KA HKR 1791-33-5).
74  HL G. C. I. Dep. Book 76. No 1790-7231.
75  Ibid. No. 
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the prisoner exchange would be moved from the Croatian border to Ruschuk 
(Ruse, Bulgaria), so Wallis suggested that a certain major, Count Strassoldo, 
serve as head of  the newly appointed exchange commission.76 
Wallis, however, waited for the Turks to take the initial step. When he 
received information according to which a batch of  released Austrian prisoners 
(7 officers and 93 privates) had arrived in Ruschuk from Constantinople, he 
immediately (on January 10, 1790) asked the General Commando to send 300 
prisoners from Kassa to Temesvár (Timişoara, Romania), because there were 
not enough prisoners in Transylvania and Galicia to release in exchange. Buda 
forwarded the order to the Invalid Commando in Kassa that day.77 As Wallis 
indicated in his report, the Turks transported the Austrian officers by horse and 
the common prisoners by carts to the exchange site. In the name of  reciprocity, 
the Austrians were also expected to move their prisoners from Kassa to the 
border by the same means of  transportation.78
The withdrawal of  the Turkish prisoners from Hungary and other parts of  
the Habsburg Monarchy, however, lasted for months. According to the report 
of  the exchange commission, from January 10, 1791 to March 29 of  the same 
year, 1,238 Turks were handed over to the Turkish commissar, Mohamed Emin, 
in six stages. In return, the kaiserlich-königliche army received only 18 officers and 
538 NCOs and privates from the slave house in Constantinople. The exchanges 
took place in Giurgevo (opposite Ruschuk on the northern part of  the Danube 
River) and around Vidin.79 
The peace was finally signed in Sistova on August 4, 1791, but the real 
winner of  the war had been Russia, which had gained Crimea once for all, and, 
with it, dominance over the Black Sea, in the peace of  Jassy, which was signed on 
January 9, 1792. The last Turkish war of  Austria, which caused so much death, 
suffering and destruction, ended with very few results. Belgrade and Wallachia 
had to be handed back to the Ottomans. Only the town of  Orşova and two 
small strips on the Croatian frontier were ceded to Austria at the price of  at 
least 30,000-40,000 soldiers lost (most of  whom had succumbed to disease, like 
76  KA HKR 1790-33-252.
77  HL G. C. I. Dep. Book 77. No. 1791-283.
78  Order of  the War Council to the General Commando. Vienna, January 15. KA HKR 1791-33-9.
79  The Turks, however, could not hand over the 32 Austrian prisoners, who had been drafted to 
the Ottoman Fleet. Report of  major count Johann von Strassoldo, head of  the exchange commission. 
Bucharest, May 11, 1791. KA HKR 1790-33-252.
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emperor Joseph II himself) and thousands more civilians killed, forced to flee, 
impoverished or even enslaved.80 
Conclusion
To respond to the questions raised in the introduction, Joseph II, who strove for 
uniformity in every respect, granted the captured Turks soldiers prisoner-of-war 
status. Indeed he was rather ahead of  his time. In the first convention of  Geneva 
(1864), the rights of  the prisoners of  war were recognized by the majority of  
military powers. These rights were roughly similar to those prescribed by Joseph 
for Turkish prisoners of  war some three generations earlier. As I have shown, 
captives were given regular supplies and enjoyed almost similar portions in kind 
and in cash as an Austrian common soldier in peacetime. They could also keep 
their money and personal belongings. The sick and wounded Turks were looked 
after in military hospitals, although these lazarettos were known by the Austrian 
soldiers themselves as places to be avoided at all cost. Joseph acknowledged the 
status of  the enemy officers, too. Captives were permitted to write letters home, 
although translated summaries of  these letters made it as far as the writing 
desk of  the emperor in Vienna. In January 1789, Joseph finally prohibited 
correspondence by prisoners.81 
On the other hand Joseph was not willing to grant Christians who served in 
the Ottoman army the status of  prisoner of  war. They were treated as mercenaries, 
not “legal” combatants, so the logical step was to press them into the Austrian 
army. This method also suited well the practices of  the embryonic mass-armies, 
which suffered from a constant deficiency of  manpower. It was, however, always 
emphasized that this measure only applied to Christians who had actually taken 
arms against the Austrian troops, and not to servants or other auxiliaries. By 
that time, the non-Muslim elements of  the Ottoman Army consisted of  mainly 
peasants, who had been forced to dig trenches, transport materials, and other 
serve auxiliary functions. This meant that most of  the captured Christians fell 
in the non-combatant category and only a few of  them were forced into the 
Austrian army. One other possible reason for this distinction may have lain in 
80  The total sum can be estimated as high as 80 000. See Mayer, Joseph II 68. The fate of  the former, as 
captured Austrian soldiers, merits further research.
81  On January 31, 1789, the Hungarian General Commando forwarded to the Aulic Council 11 letters 
from the Turks who being held in Győr at the time. KA HKR 1789-33-17. 
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the efforts Joseph had previously made to prompt Orthodox Christian Serbs 
and Romanians to rise up and rebel against the Ottoman yoke.82  
Methodically, however, it would be fairer to compare the Austrian conduct 
with regards to captives to the conduct of  the two other belligerents, the 
Ottomans and the Russians. In this context, the measures taken by the Austrian 
army were remarkably humane. In some cases, neither the Turks nor the Russians 
bothered to take prisoners at all. Cossacks on the Russian side and Tartars on the 
Ottoman side were famous for their cruelty. There were countless examples of  
brutality. The Russians under Prince Potemkin massacred the Turkish garrison 
of  the Fortress of  Ochakov during the final assault on the night of  December 
16, 1788. During the capture of  Ismail, the other Russian commander, Suvorov, 
had his troops to kill everyone in the fortress on December 10, 1790. 4,000 
enemy soldiers were massacred in a few hours. 83
Europeans believed that the Turks generally killed and beheaded their 
Christian prisoners on the spot because their officers would reward them for 
every decapitated head. Many memoires and official reports mention this habit, 
which may not have been simply “barbarism,” brutality or religious fanaticism. 
A certain Prussian officer, J. E. G. Hayne, explained the Turkish “barbarity” by 
religious hatred, and, most importantly, lack of  discipline. Hayne contended that 
European troops were also inclined to commit such acts when, after a bloody 
and chaotic fight, discipline and the control of  the officers had been shaken, 
as happened during and after the final assault on Buda in 1686. The Turkish 
commanders might also have used this as a means of  compensating their men 
for the lost ransoms, since otherwise the soldiers would have been busying 
themselves with their prisoners instead of  doing their military duty. 84  
If  someone nevertheless survived the first minutes of  captivity, then came 
the real ordeals. On September 21, 1788, 822 Austrian soldiers of  the Austrian 
rearguard at Karánsebes were taken prisoner, among them a young Hungarian 
first-lieutenant, György Görgey.85 His vivid account provides a clear picture 
of  their suffering on the long death march to Constantinople. In the end of  
the 822 men, only 125 prisoners arrived to the capital alive. The rest perished 
because of  inadequate supplies and bad treatment during the 70-day march. 
82  See the mission of  Bishop Joanovic. Vaníček, Specialgeschichte, vol. 3, 365-68.
83  Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 165–67.
84  Hayne, J. E. G. Abhandlung über die Kriegskunst der Türken (Vienna: Trattnern, 1788), 12–13. 
85  Görgey Albert: “Görgey György kapitány jelentése ezredéhez török fogságából,” Hadtörténelmi 
Közlemények 15 (1914): 642.
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Those who were no longer able to walk were killed immediately. Their heads 
were chopped off  and their bodies were left to rot. The heads were shown as 
trophies, while “our companions severed the ears of  the dead to account for the 
prisoners.”86 Nevertheless, Görgey also witness some humane conduct and saw 
examples of  kindness by the captors, but usually they were simply either unable 
or unwilling to organize the provision of  sustenance and accommodation for 
several hundred men. It was also embarrassing for the Turkish commanders 
that instead of  the promised 4,000 prisoners, they only had 125 to show to the 
people of  Constantinople.
In this context, one can understand the angry words of  Joseph in reply to 
the protest of  the Turks held in Szigetvár: “We have to make it clear to these 
agas that prisoners in our hands are treated more humanely than prisoners on the 
other side, so they had better stay calm.”87
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